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ABSTRACT:  An elusive goal in virtual training environments is to be able to dial up the opponent of choice – e.g., the 
Iraqi Republican Guard, an Hamas-type of Suicide Bomber, or the clandestine minions of Bin Laden, as a few examples. 
In researching alternative ways to offer such a “dial up” capability, our focus thus far is to analyze actual organizations 
to identify  “individual differences” in the form of Performance Moderator Function scorecards and a hierarchical 
game theoretic approach that captures the situation, organization, population, ideologic/motivation, strategic, and 
tactical layers of their decision making. We are also crafting a tool that can use the scorecards to semi-automatically 
assemble and deploy non-traditional Semi-Automated Forces or agents on a virtual battlefield.  As an initial proof of 
concept test, we have manually applied the approach to a scenario involving a bank bomber approaching a vehicle 
checkpoint.  The results to date indicate the approach seems to be a useful representational formalism for generic, 
implementation-free models of terrorist organizations and the behavior of their members.   Our next steps will be to 
scale up the approach and try to implement it as a terrorist generator for an existing virtual-reality training 
environment. 
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1.  Introduction and Overview 
 
This paper describes a research effort to develop 
models of terrorist organizations that will permit us to 
simulate and predict what types of decisions these 
organizations and their agents might be likely to make. 
We consider a terrorist organization to be a group 
whose aim in using violence is primarily to achieve a 
psychological effect, whether on its adversary or its 
supporters.  We assume a “rational actor” model of 
decision making as a point of departure and attempt to 
establish the utility-theoretic decision models terrorists 
might adopt in forming their organizations, in carrying 
out campaigns and operations, and in maximizing their 
strategic and tactical goals. The reader will recall that 
the rational actor model assumes only that the 
decisionmaker (and organization) seeks to take actions 
that maximize its expected utility structure – the model 
places no value judgment on whether the organization’s 
or individual’s utility structure is warranted [1]. 
 
One task of our research is to determine how best to 
construct decision-theoretic models of terrorist 
organizations and individuals. As a working hypothesis, 
we believe these organization and individual decision-
makers can be described via Markov Decision Processes 
and as repeated Bayesian games. For example, in the 
Maoist theory of armed struggle, the preparatory stage 
is characterized by actions that seek to affect separate 
portions of the populations of the nations or regions 
they are trying to influence, causing them to iterate 
(dynamically) through several states ranging from 
animosity to sympathy and membership in their 
movements [2]. Campaigns and missions of a given 
organization, also, appear to exhibit Markovian 
cyclicalities and draw from a reasonably finite pool of 
possible states and transitions.  By enumerating 
possible states, transition probabilities, and utility 
levels for diverse outcomes at each new state, we are 
currently able to instantiate a game theoretic 
representation of the organizations and actors involved, 
as will be described. At present we have pursued the 
repeated games model for representing terrorist 
behavior in a sample scenario (Section 2), and believe 
this can be extended for further simulation and 
prediction effort. However, we are open as to which 
approach to pursue (e.g., Bayesian networks might 
prove more suited as we try to scale up) and will revisit 
that as the research proceeds. 
 
Another task of this research is to cull through 
literature sources (news articles, web material, 
technical analyses, etc.) and to assemble a database 
that contains profiles of a reasonable sample of 
terrorist organizations (paramilitaries, militias, etc). 
This effort has already begun, and as we begin to 
assemble the material into a database, we hope to mine 
it via a variety of techniques to discover the important 
 
organizational and decision-maker profile parameters 
(utility structure and values), and to instantiate 
Bayesian prior probability estimates useful for 
bounding and predicting future types of decisions 
emanating from those organizations. Some of our initial 
work for assembling this database and mining it is 
described in Section 3, including current utility 
structure illustrations (what we refer to as utility 
scorecards). 
 
Lastly, we are interested in the computer generation of 
terrorist actors within a virtual reality world, and of the 
computer attempting to simulate campaigns and 
mission operations. So Section 4 of this paper briefly 
describes some of that effort as well. 
 
2.  Rational Actors and Decision Theoretic Modeling 
 
The following diagram overviews the hierarchical 
nature of terrorist organization decision-making. We do 
not propose to describe this in any detail here, although 
Section 4 gives a preliminary such description. Indeed 
there are entire books just on a single box of this 
diagram (e.g., see Drake (1999) on Terrorist Target 
Selection) [3]. Instead we will just provide a brief 
discussion about how decision theoretic approaches can 
help us to be more precise in discussing and building 
models of such a process. For this discussion we shall 
focus on the lower three boxes primarily. 
 
Figure 1 – Overview of the Terrorist Organization 
Decision Cycle 
 
Suppose a terrorist organization exists in a world that 
consists of a home base and three potential targets on 
the other side of a military checkpoint (city hall, a bank, 
and a sports arena). Suppose further that its decision 
processes have lead the organization to decide to target 
the bank via a car bomb. It further knows it must get 
through the checkpoint to carry out the bombing 
operation. We can model the course of action (COA) 
very easily via a set of likely states of the world as 
shown in Figure 2 – succeeding and escaping to return 
home, or getting caught at the checkpoint or bank, 
leading to being placed in custody or getting killed in a 
shootout.   
 
Figure 2 – A Markov Chain Depicting Discrete 
States of the World for a Specific Terrorist Course 
of Action (COA) 
Home At
Checkpoint
In Custody
At Bank
Dead
Drive
Get Caught
Drive
Shooting
Die
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Car-bomb
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Caught
Escape
Escape or abort
 
Let us examine only the checkpoint more closely, 
though we could look at each node in the same way. 
Further, keep in mind that this example is illustrative, 
and no real utility values have been specified. It will be 
a step of the research to conduct the datamining (see 
next section) and to interact with experts to elicit the 
proper structure of the graphs such as Figure 2, and the 
table elements and utilities such as in Table 1.  
 
Specifically, Table 1 shows that at the checkpoint, the 
terrorist could find the guard well-trained and in ready 
mode or in an untrained, easily surprised mode. In the 
latter case, the terrorist might feel there is some degree 
of positive utility in driving through unnoticed, 
shooting the guard and continuing (or dying). The only 
embarrassing outcome would be to get caught by an 
unready guard. In the second row, the terrorist has less 
utility for engaging in a shootout with a trained guard, 
as getting caught can lead to eventual release. The 
lower utilities in each row are for the guard and they 
may be similarly interpreted. 
P l a n  c a m p a i g n  ( s )
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Table 1 – Game Theory Matrix of Utilities 
to Each Side For Various Scenarios and Outcome 
Possibilities at the Checkpoint 
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Let us restate this more generically as a decision 
analysis of the course of action (COA) options 
(columns of the decision table). At each state, Si, the 
decision analysis would enumerate the columns, COAj, 
available to the decision maker (agent) in that situation.  
They would be things like, "drive through unnoticed", 
"attack", etc.  These are not intended as general options.  
Each situation (node) is different and would have its 
own COA options, although presumably these would be 
fairly common and would be found from datamining as 
described in the next section.  
 
The agent would next assign an expected utility, uj, to 
each COA. This would be based on a listing of 
possibility consequences, which would again be 
specific to the current state or situation, although 
ideally also tied to overall mission achievement, and 
generated from the datamining for Bayesian prior 
probabilities (and expert interviewing). In addition to a 
utility, each possibility outcome would also be assigned 
a probability, Pj, based on the agents’ beliefs about 
achieving that possibility if the option is selected. 
Expected utility, Ej, is calculated in the usual way (sum 
across outcomes of utility times probability). This gives 
the agent an ability to examine strength of belief that a 
given COA increases mission achievement and a basis 
to make a decision. For example, if expected utility of 
the jth COA is E_j, then the rational agent attempts to 
maximize E as follows: 
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Of course, in a game theoretic model, the rational 
choice is not always the strict maximum for a single 
agent, but rather the maximum that can be obtained 
based on the opponent’s actions as well. This leads to 
the notion of equilibrium points in the game matrix and 
to the idea that the agents might attempt other decision 
criteria other than strict maximizing [4,5]. Some 
alternative criteria might be: 
• Minimax  or even Maximin 
• Decisions Under Risk 
• Decisions Under Uncertainty 
 
While this remains to be proven, we do, however, 
currently believe that many terrorists will tend to follow 
basic tenets of statistical reasoning, since they believe 
they are part of a campaign and that their particular 
COAs will be followed up by other members [6]. 
Furthering their cause can be achieved even if they get 
caught or killed, and so they might not be inclined to 
adopt the Westerner’s tendency to become risk averse 
and dominated by a non-probabilistic reasoning, such 
as the criterion of least regret (as applied to a soldier’s 
life)[7].  
 
This is not to say that terrorist reasoning is error-free, 
and it is likely that behavioral decision theory and other 
judgment biases do exist for terrorist groups. For 
example, group think and mob rule will often occur in 
crowd scenes, while terrorist organizations are known 
to use anchoring and adjusting from news reports about 
other terrorist group’s actions. Similarly, the need to 
appease the political spectrum of a terrorist 
organization’s supporters can also sway decision-
making toward one extreme or another. And, 
continuing the life of the organization often becomes 
paramount, introducing more conservative thinking in 
certain respects [3]. In general we believe we can 
introduce such behavioral biases into our expected 
utility model by adjusting the utilities of a given utility 
structure or scorecard. Thus we can add a weighted 
multiplier for aggressiveness or riskiness, etc. to model 
such biases. 
 
3.  Database Construction and Datamining for 
Utility Scorecards 
 
The information held in the database of terrorist 
operations is to be a compendium of attributes that can 
be sorted relationally for the purpose of determining 
what cases most closely resemble a given situation 
within the game environment.  Each operation is a 
node within the database, and is composed of 
“scorecards” which are categories of attributes, and 
exist as sub-nodes.   
 
An example of an operation entry would be:  
PIRA 10/2/72 West Belfast.  Attack on 
undercover army recon unit “MRF” killing driver of 
van conducting surveillance [8].   
 
One example of many scorecards that would exist 
under this entry would be:    
Operation environment:  Urban 
 
Where the available values in the scorecard would be: 
Urban 
Settled 
Rural 
Forest 
Desert 
Alpine/Arctic 
 
 
The scorecard attributes are to characterize the terrorist 
organization, its ideology, political goals, campaign 
characteristics, operational environment, capabilities, 
tactics, and many other attributes. By means of these 
characterizations we hope to be able to know, when 
presented with a particular situation in a simulation, 
what a terrorist would really do.  If we can know this, 
we can realistically bound the utility structure (COAs 
for a given state) and assign utilities to the actions of 
the terrorist agent within the simulation.  
 
Figure 3 – Illustrative Scorecards for the Car 
Bomber-Checkpoint Scenario 
 
For instance, for the terrorist car bombing operation 
referred to in earlier Figure 2, Figure 3 shows the 
terrain, with some of the attributes thereof represented 
as scorecards. It also shows the ideology and population 
support.  Note that the operation takes place in an urban 
setting.  This has a correlation with the above example 
of the terrorist operation in West Belfast.  By assigning 
high probability to agent’s actions that are similar to the 
actions recorded in the scorecards for the above PIRA 
operation and others that correlate highly, we can 
attempt to automate the generation of the game matrix 
(COAs, utilities) for a new state of the world. 
 
To summarize, within the database of terrorist 
operations there is to be a dataset for each operation, 
type of organization, etc.  Each datum within the 
dataset is a “scorecard” that records an attribute of the 
operation, such as the terrain, the ideology of the 
organization, the type of weapons used, the type of 
security encountered by the agent or agents, the 
objective of the operation, and so on.  These scorecards 
are used to filter information into and out of the 
database, plus they can serve as a usage device.   
 
 
Table 2 – Some of the Scorecards that have been 
Mined from the Database About The World In 
Which a Guerilla Organization Exists 
 WA- Operational environment: 
• Urban % 
• Settled % -
• Rural % 
• Forest %-
• Desert % 
• Alpine/Arctic % - 
• Littoral %-
 
WB- Population Ratios:
• Own Group % -
• Allied group  % -
• Adversary 1 % -
• Adversary 2 % -
• Neutral % -
 
WC- External sanctuary level:
• None
• Low
• Medium
High 
WD- Level of external support:
WE- Political situation:
• Stable democracy
• Democracy in turmoil
• Civil war 
• Sectarian conflict
• Anarchy  
• Totalitarian regime
• Ethically dominated regime 
• Foreign Military occupation
  
WF- Security environment rating:
• Little security against agent 
• Moderate security
• High security 
  
WG- Security environment attributes: 
• ID/travel documents required
• Checkpoints/ID checks common
• Opponent has informant network 
• 
• 
Poor intel gathering by opponent
• 
User specifies scorecard settings for simulation environment below:       
Game Environment Initialization Worksheet 
• None
• Low
• Medium
High •
Good intel gathering by opponent
Excellent intel gathering by opponent
The user must create some scorecards which 
define the situation in which the terrorist SAF 
will operate:
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Consider an example of how the database structures 
(scorecards) can be used as a user interface. Table 2 
shows one such worksheet, which would become a 
program interface, by which the user enters a profile of 
the simulated “world” in which the terrorist 
organization and agents are to operate. The scorecards 
in Table 2 correspond to scorecards within the database 
of terrorist operations, and in this way the scorecards 
are used to screen the database for corollaries of the 
current situation within the simulation.  We explain the 
screening process in the next section. 
 
To carry this process one step further, the reader should 
realize there is a set of scorecards like Table 2 for each 
of the layers of the hierarchical decision model that 
was introduced as earlier Figure 1. Thus there is a set 
of scorecards for organization design, campaign 
planning, mission selection and planning, and 
operations (COA execution). As but one more 
example, Table 3 shows an illustration of the 
organization worksheet and some of the scorecards 
associated with it. 
 
 
Table 3 – Some of the Scorecards that have been 
Mined from the Database About The Attributes of 
a Terrorist Organization 
 
Since we have defined terrorism as violence for 
psychological effect, it would be useful to model the 
opinion of the population regarding the group.   To that 
end we have devised a model of population opinion as a 
series of finite states in a Markov chain, with the 
terrorists’ course of action affecting the probability of 
shift from one state to another [3]. 
 
Figure 4- 
Model of Population Opinion (Regarding an Organization)
Members Supporters PotentialSympathizers
Uncom-
mitted
Unsympa-
thetic Opponents Enemies
Probabilities of state 
transition For operation xi
xi = Attack against:
Government infrastructure
Businesses
Personal property
Government officials
Army Personnel
Police
Civilians
Innocent babies
Etc.
p1
p2
p3
Terrorist Operational
Choices (xi )
xi
xi
xi xixi xi xiPerception
Next State
Current
State A
x1
xi
A   B  C
p3
p3 p2 p1
p2 p1
Probabilities
TBD
Finite States in a Markov Chain
…
…
 
 This model is not one that need be developed on the 
virtual battlefield; rather it conceived of as component 
of the cased-based, offline agent generator described in 
the next section.  
 
4. Putting it All Together: Virtual World 
Construction & Simulation Procedures 
 
OA- Ideology: 
• Separatism 
• Religion 
• Liberalism 
• Anarchism 
• Communism 
• Conservatism 
• Fascism 
• Single-issue 
• Organized Crime 
  
OB - Aims: 
• Marxist revolution 
• Attain autonomy for ethic group 
• Expel occupying military force 
• Enrich self/group 
• Agitate public to support authoritarian rule 
• Establish unity of religious community 
• Cast off rule of other religious group 
• Undermine authoritarian rule 
• Defend existing order 
  
OC - Constituency: 
• Ethnic minority 
• Ethnic majority 
• Religious minority 
• Religious majority 
• Economic underclass 
• Economic middle 
• Economic upper class 
OD - Membership type:
• Intellectual/ideological
• Ethic affiliation 
• Religious affiliation
• Mercenary 
OE- Membership number:
Enter number of active members  
Enter % of total population:
  
Supporters %-
  
Potential Sympathizers %-
  
Uncommitted %-
  
Unsympathetic %-
  
Opponents %-
  
Enemies %- 
  
  
Organization Initialization Worksheet 
 
Figure 5 illustrates a decision theoretical, game theory-
based approach for the modeling of a terrorist agent 
and organization within a computer generated 
simulation environment. The flowchart uses a case-
based approach to establishing utility structures and 
weights for the agent’s actions. The flowchart currently 
is initiated by a human filling in the preliminary 
scorecards, or “worksheets,” that describe the situation 
to be modeled. 
 
1) In The topmost box, the user characterizes the 
simulated “world” in which the terrorist organization 
and its agents are to operate. This involves filling in the 
weights for earlier Table 2. 
2) In the next box, the user makes some initial 
characterizations of the simulated terrorist 
organization, and this is used to create a baseline 
generic terrorist organization, which is really a small 
set of scorecards describing the organization (as shown 
in earlier Table 3).  
3) Automated Campaign Planning: The program 
uses these characterizations to filter the database of real 
terrorist operations, in order to create a terrorist 
campaign applicable to the present situation.   
4) Automated Mission Selection: Selection of a 
target within the simulation based on the present 
situation, the campaign and analysis of the database for 
antecedents to the present conditions.  
5) Automated mission planning:  Planning the 
operational details of the mission based on the present 
situation, the target selected, and analysis of the 
database for antecedents to the present conditions.  
6) Conduct Operation: Implementation of the 
agent, tasked to the specified mission, on the virtual 
battlefield and simulation to execute the COA.  
 
In this way the program would refine the initial 
requirements of the user to produce a terrorist 
organization and agent that would behave in a realistic 
way within the confines of the simulation [9].  
 
While we have emphasized machine intelligence in 
much of this discussion, each element in this process 
should have the capacity to be manually altered by the 
user, allowing for the steering of the semi-automated 
process as it accesses the case database and the various 
models that have been built during the run of the 
program.  To that end we are designing a user interface 
that can interview the user and elicit suggested 
refinements 
 
 
Figure 5- 
Flowchart for Terrorist Decision Simulation
User initializes SimEnvironment:
Configuring scorecards identifying various aspects of the 
situation such as terrain, population ratios, security, and political situation 
Automated campaign planning:
Program devises military instrument 
to pursue political objectives
Simulation Environment
Conduct Operation:
Terrorist agent on virtual battlefield
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Returns tactics, procedures, 
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Configuring scorecards identifying group ideology, political objectives, 
and constituency. 
 
4) Looking forward: Present capability, JSAF 
Integration, and Threat Prediction 
Presently we are pursuing the development of the 
PMF/scorecard database and its user interfaces, and we 
feel that this approach will be able, as output, to provide 
a detailed profile of a terrorist operation that is realistic 
for a given situation.  This model terrorist will be 
generated offline as part of the process of implementing 
a terrorist agent within a simulation environment such 
as the military’s Joint Semi-Automated Forces or 
(JSAF) software environment. [10] This model 
generation is independent of any implementation within 
a simulation such as JSAF, but one that we feel could 
be used to provide a detailed behavioral model for a 
terrorist semi-automated force.   
 
A further consideration is whether this system holds the 
potential for actually predicting what a particular 
terrorist is likely to do.  It would seem that there is 
some scope for prediction, but that the main thrust 
would be simulating the operational environment.  If 
one is attempting to simulate just a small town or 
region, some good predictions may be arrived at. 
However, if the operational scope of the terrorist is 
large, even international, the prospects for accurately 
predicting an actual act of terrorism seem small, given 
the vastness of potential targets in this environment.  
 
Some other subtle aspects of modeling terrorist 
behavior are also problematic.  The knowledge base 
may provide an accurate model for a military campaign 
for the terrorist in a given situation, but how does the 
campaign evolve in reaction to countermeasures or a 
changing situation?  Also, clandestinity is itself known 
to cause behavior changes such as escalating violence 
in the absence of central control of the operators. Also 
“risky shift” may occur where increasingly risky 
activities are undertaken in reaction to ideological and 
peer pressures.   “Group think” may occur that 
suppresses rational planning and objection by minority 
opinions within the organization [3].  These and other 
factors are research dimensions we have only just 
begun to model. Presently our case-based model 
generator does not provide for such evolving aspects 
of terrorist behavior.   Predictive modeling of terrorist 
behavior would seem to require their inclusion in the 
equation, and we hope to investigate this further.  
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